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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Sonnie Flores pled guilty to felony eluding. He
received a unified sentence of five years, with three years fixed, and the court placed
him on probation. After a probation violation, the district court retained jurisdiction.
Following his rider, the district court relinquished jurisdiction. On appeal, Mr. Flores
contends that the district court abused its discretion in relinquishing its jurisdiction, erred
in denying his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion asking to complete
a rider program because the district court believed it did not have the authority to do so,
and abused its discretion in failing to place him back on a rider in light of the additional
information submitted in conjunction with his Rule 35 motion.
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
In the early morning hours of August 4, 2012, law enforcement observed a car
being driven by Sonnie Flores illegally crossing multiple lanes while making a left hand
turn.

(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI),1 p.3.)

When law

enforcement attempted to stop the car, it sped up and drove away from the officers.
(PSI, p.3.) Law enforcement followed the car Mr. Flores was driving, and, during the
pursuit, Mr. Flores’ car reached an estimated 85-90 miles per hour.

(PSI, p.3.)

Mr. Flores eventually stopped the car after spike strips were employed. (PSI, p.3.)
Officers learned that Mr. Flores’ driver’s license was suspended. (PSI, p.4.) Officers
noticed the odor of alcohol on his breath, but the subsequent breath test was deficient.
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(PSI, pp.3-4.)

A blood draw was performed.

(PSI, p.4.)

When Mr. Flores was

searched, officers found marijuana paraphernalia. (PSI, p.4.) Based on these facts,
Mr. Flores was charged by Information with one count of felony eluding. 2 (R., pp.6163.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Flores pled guilty to the felony eluding.
(R., pp.84-94.)

As part of the plea agreement, the State agreed to recommend a

sentence of five years, with two years fixed, and that the district court retain jurisdiction.
(R., pp.84-94.)

The district court accepted the plea, ordered a Presentence

Investigation and a DUI evaluation and set the matter for sentencing. (R., pp.83-95.)
The district court sentenced Mr. Flores to a unified sentence of five years, with
three years fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed him on probation for four
years. (R., pp.121, 124-136.)
In 2014, a report of probation violation was filed which alleged that Mr. Flores
was discharged from his treatment classes, twice used methamphetamine and once
used marijuana.

(R., pp.140-150.)

Mr. Flores admitting to violating terms and

conditions of his probation and the district court revoked his probation but then placed
him back on probation for two years. (R., pp.183-195.)
In 2015, the State filed two reports of probation violation which asserted that
Mr. Flores violated his probation by failing to pay his fines, fees, or restitution; being
charged with new crimes—domestic battery, resisting and obstructing, and providing

Appellant’s use of the designation “PSI” includes the packet of documents grouped
with the electronic copy of the PSI, including the original PSI, the Addendums to the
PSI, the DUI Evaluation, and letters submitted in support of Mr. Flores.
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false information; failing to report to his probation officer as instructed; failing to notify
his probation officer of a change in his residence; absconding; failing to pay his costs of
supervision; failing to submit to UAs; failing to maintain full-time employment; and
associating with a person not approved by his probation officer. (R., pp.197-216, 227238.) Mr. Flores admitted to violating some of the terms and conditions of his probation,
and the State agreed not to file new charges relating to law enforcement contact on
June 6, 2015, pursuant to an agreement.3

(8/7/15 Tr., p.3, L.13 – p.10, L.22;

R., pp.253-254.) On August 7, 2015, the district court revoked Mr. Flores’ probation, but
retained jurisdiction over him for a period of up to 365 days. (8/7/15 Tr., p.16, Ls.9-19;
R., pp.255-260.) An amended order retaining jurisdiction was entered on September
18, 2015. (R., pp.261-266.)
On December 15, 2015, the district court relinquished jurisdiction without a
hearing and ordered Mr. Flores to serve the underlying sentence previously imposed.
(R., pp.267-273.)

Mr. Flores was also charged with several misdemeanors in Twin Falls County case
number CR-2012-9084--excessive DUI, possession of drug paraphernalia, and driving
without privileges. (PSI, p.7.)
3 The offer-plea agreement filed the day Mr. Flores admitted to violating his probation
was certainly ambiguous—it contained language from the initial change of plea but also
incorporated language regarding the pending probation violation. (R., p.254.) The
agreement, drafted by the State, required Mr. Flores to waive events that had already
happened and purported to be contingent on the waiver of the completion of a form that
had already been signed and filed several years previously. (8/7/15 Tr., p.3, Ls.16-19;
R., p.254.) See State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 593, 596 (2010) (“Ambiguities in a plea
agreement are to be interpreted in favor of the defendant.”) Further, the agreement
mandated conditions upon the district court, although the district court was not a party to
the agreement. (R., p.254.) The agreement required Mr. Flores to waive his right to file
a Rule 35 motion from the initial Judgment and appeal any issues, including “any rulings
made by the court,” however, the use of the past tense indicates that no future waiver
was intended. (R., p.254) (emphasis added). See State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 886
(2013).
2
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On December 30, 2015, Mr. Flores filed timely I.C.R. 35 Motion (hereinafter, Rule
35) asking the district court to reconsider its decision to relinquish jurisdiction and
instruct the Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC) to re-integrate Mr. Flores into the
rider program so that he may have an opportunity to complete the program.
(R., pp.274-278.)

On January 6, 2016, the district court denied Mr. Flores’ Rule 35

motion without a hearing, holding that another period of retained jurisdiction could not
be ordered absent an intervening period of probation. (R., pp.279-281.) The district
court’s order denying Mr. Flores’ Rule 35 motion also advised the defendant of his right
to appeal the order within 42 days. (R., p.285.) Mr. Flores timely appealed from the
order relinquishing jurisdiction and the district court’s order denying his I.C.R. 35 motion.
(R., pp. 288-291.)
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ISSUES
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over
Mr. Flores?

2.

Did the district court err in holding it did not have the authority to retain
jurisdiction so that Mr. Flores could complete a rider program?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Flores’ Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 Motion in light of the new information provided in support
thereof?

5

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction Over
Mr. Flores
Before the district court relinquishes jurisdiction over a defendant, it must
evaluate whether probation would be appropriate under I.C. § 19-2521.

State v.

Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137 (2001). “The decision to place a defendant on probation or
whether, instead, to relinquish jurisdiction over the defendant is a matter within the
sound discretion of the district court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an
abuse of that discretion.”

State v. Schultz, 149 Idaho 285, 288-289 (Ct. App.

2010). Upon review of a sentence following a period of retained jurisdiction, this Court
reviews the entire record, encompassing events both before and after the original
judgment. Id. at 289.
Mr. Flores contends the district court abused its discretion in relinquishing
jurisdiction in light of his successes during his brief period of retained jurisdiction, his
recognition of a problem, and his desire to make the changes necessary so that this
type of incident does not happen again.
Mr. Flores was participating in his programming and had expressed a willingness
to change his criminal thinking and behavior.

(PSI, pp.48-50.)

Despite his limited

reading ability, Mr. Flores reads at a fifth grade level,4 Mr. Flores was making progress
on his assignments and beginning to speak up in classes. (PSI, pp.48-50.) Although,

Mr. Flores was kicked out of school when he was in sixth grade and had not yet
obtained a GED. (8/7/15 Tr., p.15, Ls.21-24.)

4
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while on his rider, Mr. Flores did receive disciplinary sanctions,5 his rider began “with a
promising start and his participation in groups was at a high level.” (PSI, p.50.) Further,
Mr. Flores had “professed a desire to end his active addiction to Methamphetamine.”
(PSI, p.50.) While Mr. Flores was quiet in group unless called on, he volunteered
feedback for his peers, and he was able to accept feedback and apply it to his own
work. (PSI, p.48.) However, Mr. Flores was removed from the institution in which he
was receiving programming during the pendency of an investigation for conduct in
which he was not involved and was unable to resume programming. (PSI, pp.47-50.)
The district court failed to recognize that Mr. Flores’ accomplishments while on
the retained jurisdiction were limited by the brief two month period of programming
Mr. Flores participated in prior to being removed from the institution due to a pending
investigation. (PSI, pp.52-54.)
Essentially, Mr. Flores was relinquished because he had been moved to a
different facility while he was suspected of being involved in a battery that occurred at
NICI.

(PSI, pp.45-52.) Although he was interviewed but not implicated in any

wrongdoing (other than associating with persons who were involved in the incident), his
removal from programming pending the investigation proved detrimental—Mr. Flores
could not complete the programming he had started due to his early removal from the
facility. (PSI, pp.45-52.)

During a family emergency, Mr. Flores used the PINs of other offenders to place
telephone calls; this behavior resulted in a formal disciplinary infraction. (PSI, pp.4647.)

5
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In light of all of the mitigating evidence that was presented to the district court
that demonstrates Mr. Flores’ significant rehabilitative potential, the district court abused
its discretion when relinquished its jurisdiction over Mr. Flores.
II.
The District Court Erred When It Held It Did Not Have Authority To Retain Jurisdiction
So That Mr. Flores Could Complete A Rider Program
The district court erred in finding it lacked jurisdiction to retain jurisdiction and
order Mr. Flores back into IDOC rider programming.
Idaho Code Section 19-2601 provides, in relevant part:
Whenever any person shall have been convicted, or enter a plea of guilty,
in any district court of the state of Idaho, of or to any crime against the
laws of the state, except those of treason or murder, the court in its
discretion may. . . Suspend the execution of the judgment at any time
during the first three hundred sixty-five (365) days of a sentence to the
custody of the state board of correction. The court shall retain jurisdiction
over the prisoner for a period of up to the first three hundred sixty-five
(365) days. Except as provided for in section 19-2601A, Idaho Code,
during the period of retained jurisdiction, the state board of correction shall
be responsible for determining the placement of the prisoner and such
education, programming and treatment as it determines to be appropriate.
The prisoner will remain committed to the board of correction if not
affirmatively placed on probation by the court.
I.C. § 19-2601(4).
Idaho Criminal Rule 35(b) provides that a defendant may file a motion to reduce
the sentence within 120 days from when the judgment of conviction is filed or within 120
days of when the court releases retained jurisdiction. I.C.R. 35(b); State v. Clontz, 156
Idaho 787, 792 (Ct. App. 2014).
Idaho Code Section 19-2601(4) also addresses additional periods of retained
jurisdiction:
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The court in its discretion may sentence a defendant to more than one (1)
period of retained jurisdiction after a defendant has been placed on
probation in a case . . .
I.C. § 19-2601(4).
On August 7, 2015, the district court revoked Mr. Flores’ probation, but retained
jurisdiction over him for a period of up to 365 days. (R., pp.255-260.) On December 15,
2015, the district court relinquished jurisdiction without a hearing and ordered Mr. Flores
to serve the underlying sentence previously imposed.

(R., pp.267-273.)

On

December 30, 2015, Mr. Flores filed timely Rule 35 seeking a modification of his
sentence in the form of another opportunity to complete a rider program. (R., pp.274278.) However, the district court denied Mr. Flores’s Rule 35 motion without a hearing,
holding that another period of retained jurisdiction could not be ordered absent an
intervening period of probation. (R., pp.279-281.)
In his Rule 35 motion, Mr. Flores requested leniency in the form of an opportunity
to complete another rider. (R., pp.274-277.) The district court denied the request,
holding that it lacked jurisdiction to place Mr. Flores on another rider, “[h]is sole request
is for another chance at a Rider, which the court cannot grant.”

(R., pp.281-285.)

Specifically, the district court held:
I.C. § 19-2601(4) provides that “[t]he court in its discretion may sentence a
defendant to more than one (1) period of retained jurisdiction after a
defendant has been placed on probation . . .” Idaho’s appellate courts
have interpreted this language to mean that a court may not place a
defendant on a second period of retained jurisdiction absent an
intervening period of probation. State v. Gill, 150 Idaho 183, 186, 244 P.3d
1269, 1272 (Ct. App. 2010).
(R., p.283.) However, the court’s holding was erroneous. The district court had the
authority to continue Mr. Flores on the same rider (or a new rider) so long as it was
within the period of retained jurisdiction.

Such is the plain language of I.C. § 199

2601(4). That is, a period of retained jurisdiction is not automatically terminated simply
because the Idaho Department of Corrections sends the defendant back to court with a
“relinquish” recommendation.
During a “period of retained jurisdiction” a defendant typically receives
programming called a “rider,” however, the terms are not interchangeable.

For

example, during a 365 day period of retained jurisdiction, a defendant could potentially
complete one or more rider programs within the 365 day period.

(See PSI, p.45

(describing Mr. Flores’ “Rider” Type as an “Extended 180-Day ‘Rider’”).) However, the
district court in this case found that it could not retain jurisdiction over Mr. Flores absent
an intervening period of probation. What the district court misunderstood was that, it
could have gone back to the order relinquishing and continued to retain jurisdiction over
Mr. Flores and ordered him to receive rider programming while in the custody of the
Idaho Department of Corrections. See I.C. § 19-2601(4) (“during the period of retained
jurisdiction, the state board of correction shall be responsible for determining the
placement of the prisoner and such education, programming and treatment as it
determines to be appropriate.”)
In holding that it lacked jurisdiction to order a second period of retained
jurisdiction, the district court relied on the Court of Appeals’ decision in State v. Gill;
however, the facts of Gill are easily distinguished. 150 Idaho 183 (Ct. App. 2010)
(holding that the “plain meaning of ‘after a defendant has been placed on probation in a
case’ from I.C. § 19-2601(4) leads us to conclude that a district court may order a
second period of retained jurisdiction only after a defendant has been placed on an
intervening period.”) In Gill, the defendant filed a Rule 35 motion seeking a second
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period of retained jurisdiction after jurisdiction was relinquished at the end of his period
of retained jurisdiction. Id. at 185. There, the defendant sought a second, consecutive
retained jurisdiction which would have effectively extended the period of retained
jurisdiction from 180 to 360 days.6 Id. at 186. The Idaho Court of Appeals held that the
district court lacked the authority to order a second period of retained jurisdiction without
first placing the defendant on probation. Id. Once a court has retained jurisdiction for
the statutory period, pursuant to the statute it may either relinquish jurisdiction or place
the defendant on probation, or, in extraordinary circumstances, extend its jurisdiction for
“a reasonable time” not exceeding thirty days. I.C. § 19-2601(4).
Here, the district court did not allow jurisdiction to lapse, instead it affirmatively
relinquished jurisdiction before jurisdiction would have automatically lapsed. Notably,
Mr. Flores did not ask for a new period of retained jurisdiction, he asked that he be
allowed another chance to complete his rider. (R., p.277.) Mr. Flores’ Rule 35 motion
and subsequent appeal were timely from the order relinquishing jurisdiction. Should the
district court have granted the Rule 35 motion, it could simply have vacated its previous
order relinquishing and Mr. Flores would once again be placed in IDOC programming.
He still had well over six months within the original period of retained jurisdiction in
which he could have participated in a rider program.
The district court erred in denying Mr. Flores’ Rule 35 motion because it believed
it did not have the authority to order the remedy Mr. Flores requested.

When the district court retained jurisdiction over Mr. Gill, I.C. § 19-2601 provided that
jurisdiction could be retained by the district court for up to 180 days. Effective July 1,
2010, the statute was amended to allow a district court to retain jurisdiction for up to 365
days. I.C. § 19-2601.
6
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III.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying Mr. Flores’ Rule 35 Motion In Light
Of The New Information Submitted In Support Of The Rule 35 Motion
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency that may
be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 125
Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994).

“The criteria for examining rulings denying the

requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether the original
sentence was reasonable.” Id. “If the sentence was not excessive when pronounced,
the defendant must later show that it is excessive in view of new or additional
information presented with the motion for reduction. Id. “When presenting a Rule 35
motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or
additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule
35 motion.” State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007).
The new information presented in support of Mr. Flores’ Rule 35 motion showed
that pictures that were alleged to have been gang-related were sent in by family
members and were mixed in with many other pictures; he worked out once with a group
of individuals that were later alleged to be reinforcing gang activity and he did not
deliberately do anything to reinforce gang activities on the rider; he used the PIN
numbers of other inmates during a family emergency—his son was in the hospital; he
was not involved in or aware of the assault and battery on the other inmate. (R., p.276.)
Mr. Flores had associated with certain individuals and IDOC officials removed
Mr. Flores and several other individuals after the incident to conduct an investigation.
(R., p.276.) Thus, Mr. Flores’ programming was interrupted, and after “no definitive
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information came forth implicating Mr. Flores” in gang activity or with involvement in the
assault and battery of the other inmate, the district court received a recommendation for
relinquishment of Mr. Flores’ jurisdiction. (R., p.276; PSI, p.44.) However, the IDOC
report only equivocally recommended relinquishment, recommending:
Mr. Flores would benefit from further treatment as he has yet to address
the major features of his addiction and his criminal thinking due to early
removal from the program as such he has a poor candidate for probation
at this time. However, given another opportunity at treatment in a secure
facility, he may finish his “Rider” and be a successful candidate for
probation.
(PSI, p.50) (emphasis added).
In light of Mr. Flores’s progress, the district court should have retained
jurisdiction and placed him back in the custody of IDOC so that he could complete the
rider programming.
In light of the new information presented in support of his Rule 35 motion,
Mr. Flores asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it declined to reverse
its decision to relinquish jurisdiction and allow him an opportunity to complete a rider.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Flores respectfully requests that this Court remand his case with instructions
allowing him the opportunity to complete a rider. Alternatively, Mr. Flores requests that
this Court remand his case and that he be placed on probation.
DATED this 3rd day of October, 2016.

___________/s/______________
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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